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[REDACTED]

NATIONALIST CHINA: Senior officials seem quite realistic about Taipei's UN prospects.

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NATIONALIST CHINA: SENIOR NATIONALIST OFFICERS SEEM QUITE REALISTIC IN PRIVATE ABOUT TAIPEI'S UN PROSPECTS, BUT THEY CONTINUE TO HOLD TO THE STATUS QUO IN FORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION ISSUE, VICE FOREIGN MINISTER YANG CENTERED HIS OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON THE NEED FOR CONTINUED USE OF THE IMPORTANT QUESTION {IQ} RESOLUTION, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] HE ADDED THAT THE NATIONALISTS APPRECIATE US CONSIDERATION OF A THIRD RESOLUTION TO BE PROPOSED WITH THE IQ TO COUNTER THE ALBANIAN RESOLUTION, BUT THAT TAIPEI "CANNOT AT THIS TIME SUBSCRIBE TO ANY DUAL REPRESENTATION" FORMULA.

IN PRIVATE TALKS SINCE LAST NOVEMBER WITH US OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, SENIOR NATIONALISTS HAVE INDICATED A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE PROBABLE UNFAVORABLE VOTING PATTERN IN 1971 AND FOR THE FIRST TIME DISCUSSED VARIOUS TACTICS--INCLUDING SEVERAL DUAL REPRESENTATION FORMULAS--FOR COPING WITH THE SITUATION. IN ADDITION, AT THE LATEST MEETING ON 10 MARCH THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES AGREED WITH EVERY POINT MADE BY THE US OFFICERS--BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THE CONVERSATION MUST BE KEPT COMPLETELY "OFF THE RECORD."

VICE MINISTER YANG HIMSELF HAS PRIVATELY ASSURED THE US AMBASSADOR THAT HE HAS EMPHASIZED THE "DANGERS OF THE PRESENT POSITION" AND THE "NEED FOR A NEW FORMULA" TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK. BUT, IN LIGHT OF NATIONALIST OFFICIALS' ADMITTED RELUCTANCE TO PRESENT UNPLEASANT DETAILS TO THE PRESIDENT, IT IS LIKELY THAT CHIANG EXPECTS ANY NEW FORMULA TO BE CLEARLY PRO-NATIONALIST AND THAT FLEXIBILITY IS LIMITED TO THOSE NATIONALISTS WHO RECOGNIZE THE CHALLENGE TO TAIPEI'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION.

TAIPEI'S HARD-LINE APPROACH AT THIS TIME IN OFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS PROBABLY IS AN EFFORT TO PREVENT THE US AND OTHER SUPPORTERS FROM COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO DRASTIC SHIFTS. IT IS ALSO UNLIKELY THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK, WHO WILL MAKE THE FINAL DECISION, HAS YET CONSIDERED THE NEED TO ALTER MEANINGFULLY HIS UN TACTICS. [REDACTED]

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
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